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Abstract: This paper provides a new argument for the relevance of empirical research to moral 
and political philosophy and a novel defense of the positive program in experimental philosophy.  
The argument centers on the idea that normative concepts used in moral and political philosophy 
can be evaluated in terms of their fruitfulness in solving practical problems.  Empirical research 
conducted with an eye to the practical problems that are relevant to particular concepts can 
provide evidence of their fruitfulness along a number of dimensions.  An upshot of the argument 
is that philosophers should not only engage with but must also be involved in conducting 
experimental studies that examine the practical roles that normative concepts can play.  Rather 
than just clearing the way for philosophical work to be done, the argument has the further 
implication that empirical research will be required to advance at least some important debates in 




Proponents and critics of experimental philosophy have distinguished between the field’s 
“negative” and “positive” programs.1  The negative program has so far attracted the most 
attention, both in the academy and in the popular press.2  This is perhaps not surprising, given the 
radical critiques of a priori philosophical methods that early papers in the negative program put 
forward (Weinberg 2007; Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Alexander et al. 2014).  Some critics 
																																																								
1 Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007); Weinberg (2007); Alexander and Weinberg (2007); 
Cappelen (2012); Alexander et al. (2014); Fisher (2015); Shepherd and Justus (2015); 
Williamson (2016).  Knobe (2016) argues that the positive-negative program distinction fails to 
capture much of the important work being conducted in the field.  Sytsma and Livengood (2016) 
propose a broader taxonomy of programs (non-intuitional, negative, positive, cognitive, and 
descriptive) and hold that the work that Knobe points to largely falls under what they refer to as 
the “cognitive program.” 
2 See, e.g., the discussion in the Opinion Pages of the New York Times (“X-Phi’s New Take on 
Old Problems” 2010). 
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of experimental philosophy direct their objections almost exclusively at the negative program, 
and seem to concede some ground to what could be thought of as the positive program 
(Williamson 2016).  Yet the positive program has not been given a robust explanation or 
defense.3  If all experimental philosophy falls into either the negative or positive program, it 
could be that many have been inclined to think of the positive program merely in contrast to the 
more widely discussed negative program. 
 Joshua Knobe has argued that the positive/negative program distinction, cashed out in 
terms of making a positive contribution to conceptual analysis or providing evidence against the 
methodological assumptions of conceptual analysis, is not helpful (Knobe 2016).  A broader 
distinction, however, can be drawn between experimental work that views itself as continuous 
with traditional a priori philosophical methods and that which views itself as discontinuous with 
or undermining those methods.  The positive program, if understood in this way, encompasses 
much of the work that Knobe points to in showing that there are overwhelming instances of 
research in experimental philosophy that fall outside of what could be regarded as the negative 
program (or the positive program, on the understandings of these terms that he is using).  Many 
philosophers and psychologists want to better understand how empirical work contributes to 
philosophical questions, and so the notion that such empirical work is continuous with traditional 
philosophical methods requires justification. 
 This paper provides an argument in support of the positive program, understood as the 
program of bringing empirical research to bear on philosophical questions in ways that are 
continuous with traditional a priori research methods.  I argue that philosophers should be 
involved in conducting at least some of the empirical research that bears on issues in moral and 
																																																								
3 Of course, there are some exceptions.  See, e.g., Shepherd and Justus (2015). 
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political philosophy.4  Many theorists hold the view that the normative concepts employed in 
these fields,5 in addition to being coherent and well motivated from a purely theoretical 
perspective, should be evaluated in part by the practical role that they play.  The extent to which 
moral and political concepts play their practical role well I will call “fruitfulness,” a term that I 
borrow from Carnap (1950).6  The fruitfulness of moral and political concepts, on my view – and 
by concepts, I intend to capture also the norms, theories, and principles that fall under them, or 
“conceptions”7 of concepts – can only be determined with the help of empirical investigation.  In 
particular, determining whether or not a given moral or political concept will be fruitful in 
solving practical problems is a question that requires empirical knowledge to answer.  The 
argument therefore provides a new justification for the “positive program” in experimental 
philosophy in terms of its importance to moral and political philosophy.  Indeed, my view has the 
implication that the positive program is not merely in the service of philosophical research, but 





4 While I focus primarily on psychological research, the argument that I present in this paper 
supports a wide role for empirical research from other social sciences in moral and political 
philosophy.  It may also support a broader role for non-empirical research in some of these 
fields, including economic theory, social choice theory, and game theory, but establishing this 
point would go beyond the bounds of the present paper.  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer 
for suggesting that my argument may also encompass some non-empirical research. 
5 I will remain neutral on the degree to which normative concepts employed in other fields of 
philosophy, such as epistemology or aesthetics, can be similarly evaluated in terms of their 
fruitfulness.  Some commentators have suggested that what I have to say here about moral and 
political concepts can be extended to these other fields. 
6 Carnap used this term in putting forward a somewhat different view of the practical role that 
scientific concepts play.  I discuss this in Section 4. 
7 The distinction between concepts and conceptions is due to Rawls (1971). 
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1. The Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts 
 
 There’s an unspoken agreement between positive program experimental philosophers and 
moral and political philosophers who are receptive to experimental philosophy but do not 
conduct empirical research.  The former won’t press on where the intuitions come from or the 
scientific explanations of where our judgments get their hold if the latter don’t make them say 
why the social sciences are important to ethics.  Instead of leaving this situation as it stands, we 
should be confident that good explanations can be given on the second issue that are compatible 
with non-reductive, non-skeptical accounts of the first issue.  This paper provides one such 
attempt at addressing the second issue, by showing that in order to evaluate the fruitfulness of 
moral and political concepts, research in the social sciences must be engaged with and, in my 
view, even conducted by philosophers. 
One way into thinking about the fruitfulness of these normative concepts is to consider 
the purposes for which we engage in moral inquiry.  Aristotle famously held that human beings 
have a telos or an end, but his remarks on the end of ethical study are often overlooked.  In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, he claims that we study ethics for a different reason than we study 
other areas of philosophy and subject matters: “we are not conducting this inquiry in order to 
know what virtue is, but in order to become good” (Aristotle 1999, Book II.2, emphasis mine).  
The study of ethics has a point for Aristotle, to help us figure out how to live our lives in the best 
way, which for him is the life of virtue.  I mention this remark not because I wish to defend 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, but because we can see what is deeply correct about Aristotle’s general 
claim while expanding the range of purposes that moral and political concepts might have. 
 5 
 Normative concepts help us to live together with other human beings by aiding us in 
coordinating our behavior and cooperating with one another (Kitcher 2014).  Working in moral 
and political philosophy, we are developing on a pre-existing tapestry of norms, theories, and 
principles, which sometimes cluster around a particular concept, and that have helped us to avoid 
conflict and inefficiency better than we would have without them.8  As I will demonstrate, moral 
and political concepts can be and often are evaluated in terms of their “fruitfulness,” by which I 
mean how well they help us to solve practical problems, problems that we inevitably face as 
human beings.  Many moral and political philosophers are committed to the fruitfulness of 
normative concepts mattering to their evaluation, and in this minimal sense are sympathetic to 
the Aristotelian understanding of the purposes of moral inquiry.9 
 Of course, there is another tradition in moral and political philosophy that eschews 
fruitfulness, aligning more closely with Plato’s views than those of Aristotle that I have just 
mentioned.  According this line of normative inquiry, moral and political concepts are no 
different than non-normative concepts, in the sense that the practical roles that they might play 
should be extrinsic to any evaluations we might make of them.10  Norms, theories, and principles 
that fall under these concepts are to be examined in terms of theoretical virtues that exclude any 
role that these concepts have in our practical deliberations or solving problems that arise in our 
interactions with one another. 
																																																								
8 Garner (2007) disagrees, but the view that morality should be abolished is not widely held.  
Walker (2007) emphasizes the negative social roles that moral and political concepts often play, 
but doesn’t take this to show that we should try to do away with them. 
9 This commitment does not require one to adopt any substantive positions in moral or political 
philosophy that Aristotle or Aristotelians endorse.  It is instead a general commitment regarding 
how normative concepts should be evaluated, where their fruitfulness should go into such 
evaluations. 
10 For recent defenses of this view, see Cohen (2008), Enoch (2011), and Estlund (2014). 
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 Fully examining and adjudicating the debate between these long-standing camps in moral 
and political philosophy is beyond the bounds of this paper.11  Rather than doing so, my goal in 
this paper is more modest.  My primary task is to illustrate the various ways empirical research 
can be brought to bear on the fruitfulness of normative concepts.  And in the course of doing so, 
I will point out the many instances in which moral and political philosophers have committed 
themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, to the fruitfulness of these concepts and the norms, 
theories, and principles that fall under them mattering for their evaluation.  Rather than directly 
arguing against the Platonic view or for the Aristotelian view, then, the paper will make salient 
many of the types of research that bear on the kinds of questions that the Aristotelian view draws 
our attention to.  And further, it will make clear what is at stake in adopting the Aristotelian 
view, what is made on limits in the study of normative concepts in doing so, and what cannot be 
part of the examination of normative concepts if we separate their evaluation from their 
fruitfulness. 
 I will therefore begin by pointing out a number of ways in which moral and political 
concepts can be and often are evaluated in terms of their fruitfulness.  I will often refer to norms, 
theories, and principles that fall under a concept, what John Rawls (1971/rev. 1999) referred to 
as “conceptions” of concepts, because they are typically the items that are evaluated using 
practical criteria. 
 Starting with the view that normative concepts are fruitful to the extent that they help us 
to solve practical problems, a number of roles can be seen for these concepts and the norms, 
																																																								
11 See Korsgaard (2003) for a characterization of this disagreement in terms of the history of the 
debate between realism and constructivism in moral philosophy.  One need not be a 
constructivist to endorse what I will say here, but I will suggest that Korsgaard is committed to 
the fruitfulness of normative concepts mattering to their evaluation in Section 2. 
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theories, and principles falling under them in addressing practical problems.  To understand 
which normative concepts can help us to solve the practical problems that they are supposed to, 
notably, empirical facts come into play.  These facts include: 1) how people will act when 
particular norms, theories, and principles are internalized (call this “Motivation”); 2) how people 
will be prevented from acting when such norms, theories, and principles are internalized 
(“Prevention”); 3) whether when norms, theories, and principles compete with bias and other 
problematic such items, some are more effective in “fighting back” (“Resilience”); 4) whether 
some norms, theories, and principles are better subjects of consensus among people with other 
commitments that diverge but are nonetheless consistent with good will and a desire for peaceful 
coexistence (“Consensus”); and 5) whether these norms, theories, and principles provide or help 
us to formulate more useful prescriptions than others with respect to problems that we must solve 
(“Guidance”).  Each of these roles highlight that, at least in the normative domain, empirical 
facts can help us to see whether concepts can help us to solve important practical problems: 
 
1) How people will act when such norms, theories, and principles are internalized (Motivation) 
 
 It is not uncommon for philosophers to be concerned with evaluating moral and political 
concepts in terms of the effects that would result from their adoption.  In examining these effects, 
one natural question to ask is how people will act when they employ these concepts and the 
norms, theories, and principles that fall under them.  The self-effacingness objection to 
consequentialism is one example of a challenge to the fruitfulness of a moral theory in terms of 
how the theory would motivate people to act.  According to that objection, it is a strike against 
consequentialist moral theories that they recommend that agents not internalize 
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consequentialism, in the sense of using a consequentialist decision procedure for action.  Agents 
that did so would not be motivated to perform actions that meet the consequentialist’s own 
requirement to maximize good consequences, and by this requirement it would be better, the 
objection continues, if they followed their moral intuitions12 or some other non-consequentialist 
guide to action.  This is the sense in which consequentialism is supposed to be “self-effacing.”  I 
am not asserting that the self-effacingness objection to consequentialism is successful.  Many 
responses have been offered to it (see, e.g., Parfit 1992).  My point is that this well-known 
objection to consequentialism suggests that philosophers are interested in what I am referring to 
as the motivational fruitfulness of a normative concept – what human beings who have 
internalized the concept or the norms, theories, and principles that fall under it, will be motivated 
to do. 
 Another example of a debate where the motivational force of normative concepts has 
been thought to matter is found in the literature on duties to the global poor.  Peter Singer (1972) 
famously argued that we can extract stringent moral duties to help people in severe poverty in 
developing countries from principles of beneficence that we are committed to.  Alison Jaggar 
(2001, 2005) and Thomas Pogge (2008) have argued, however, that while principles of 
beneficence also apply, more stringent duties against committing harm following from principles 
of justice have been violated by the affluent that make the requirement to address global poverty 
even stronger.  Many have claimed that there will be a motivational difference between 
arguments that appeal to these two different types of principles because the principles of justice 
in question involve wrongful actions that have been committed, namely the collective imposition 
																																																								
12 The assumption here, of course, is that they have the kinds of deontological moral intuitions 
that most people report.  If the person in question has consequentialist moral intuitions, following 
those intuitions will involve acting on consequentialist principles. 
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of an unjust global order and a history of violent oppression through colonialism and 
imperialism.  These negative duties are thought by some to be more motivating than the positive 
duties that Singer points to, which only focus on our failing to help the global poor, morally 
wrong omissions rather than actions.  It has been taken as a virtue of the negative duty arguments 
that they will be more motivating than the positive duty argument with respect to global poverty 
(Pogge 2008; Lichtenberg 2010, 2014; Lawford-Smith 2012), at least when they are accepted.  
On the other hand, negative duty arguments may not succeed in being more motivating because 
people may not find it plausible that they are harming the global poor.  This may be the case in 
part because they wish to avoid feeling guilty about contributing to severe poverty, whereas it is 
easier to accept the claim that we are merely failing to help (Lichtenberg 2010).  I am again not 
taking a position in this particular debate but rather pointing to another example where the 
motivational fruitfulness of philosophical concepts, in this case principles of beneficence and 
justice as applied to a particular real-world moral problem, is thought to be relevant to their 
evaluation. 
 Empirical studies looking at the attitudes and behaviors of individuals in response to 
presenting or eliciting normative concepts can bring out the tendencies those normative concepts 
produce in action.  This can be thought of as adopting an “intervention-based method” for the 
study of the motivational fruitfulness of these concepts.  Linda Skitka’s research suggests that 
moral attitudes are especially strong and motivating commitments (Skitka et al. 2005; Skitka 
2010), but little work has been done thus far to directly examine whether and when moral 
concepts and arguments can be used to motivate moral behavior.  In the case of the self-
effacingness objection to consequentialism, the intervention-based method might involve 
priming participants to think about a given problem in consequentialist terms and seeing if their 
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actions in the experiment maximize some measure of good consequences.  Another example of 
the intervention-based method would involve presenting the arguments that Singer, Jaggar, and 
Pogge have made regarding global poverty to different groups of participants and seeing both 
whether participants find them plausible and, among those who do find them plausible overall, 
how motivated they are to adopt actions to address global poverty, such as donating money that 
they are paid for completing the study to an effective organization working to alleviate it.13  A 
non-intervention based method, by contrast, would draw out the motivational consequences of 
pre-existing acceptance and internalization of particular normative items in different individuals 
and communities.  Using this second method, we might look at the prior tendencies of different 
people towards more consequentialist or more deontological modes of ethical reasoning and how 
these people respond to decision-making tasks assigned to them.  With respect to global poverty, 
we can study the donation behavior of participants who differ in whether they view global 
poverty primarily in terms of duties of beneficence or justice and compare the motivational force 
of these ideas in this way, controlling for confounding factors such as political orientation, level 
of income, religiosity, and so on. 
These are just some of the types of empirical studies that may be conducted to examine 
the motivational force of normative concepts.  Other studies might examine the comparative or 
combined effects of normative concepts and appeals to emotion.  Deborah Small, George 
Loewenstein, and Paul Slovic (2007) famously showed that the photo of a child (“Rokia”) living 
in poverty garnered significantly higher charitable donations than that photo accompanied by 
statistical information about other children in the same situation.  Yet emotional appeals also are 
																																																								
13 Luke Buckland, David Rodríguez-Arias, Carissa Véliz, and I have conducted empirical studies 
examining the effects of reading some of these arguments on charitable giving.  See Buckland et 
al. (unpublished manuscript). 
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limited in their effectiveness by “psychic numbing,” our tendency to be able to focus our concern 
on only one individual, even when the appeal is made to our emotions rather than our rational 
capacities (Slovic 2007).  From these two points, Slovic concludes that we must seek 
institutional solutions to pressing moral problems like global poverty and the general disinterest 
with which rich nations have approached genocide in other countries (Slovic 2007, p. 91).  One 
might also conclude, however, that we should be examining which moral norms, theories, and 
principles do well in combining with appeals to our emotions to generate the greatest 
motivational effects.14   
Matthew Feinberg’s research suggests that if you want to motivate people with 
arguments, these arguments should be framed in terms of moral values that they already hold 
(Feinberg and Willer 2015).  It may then be that the motivational fruitfulness of a moral 
argument for a broad population depends, at least in part, on the presentation of the argument 
making reference to shared values, such as the values of harm and care (Graham et al. 2011; 
Haidt 2012).  Relatedly, one might examine whether different arguments work particularly well 
in specific populations and not others.  Fiery Cushman’s research on model-free versus model-
based moral reasoning (Cushman 2013) also suggests that more deontological and more 
consequentialist moral arguments may have relative costs and benefits in different contexts.  By 
assigning a moral evaluation to action types rather than examining the consequences of each 
action directly, deontological frameworks may be computationally light, yielding lesser burdens 
on people already facing limited cognitive resources and time to devote to moral causes (ibid., 
278).  On the other hand, consequentialist moral frameworks may be more flexible and allow for 
																																																								
14 Peter Singer, Paul Slovic, Daniel Västfjäll, Joshua Greene, Marcus Mayorga and I have 
recently been conducting empirical research on these issues. 
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the reexamination of the way particular actions are evaluated in the context of new moral 
problems that demand reconceptualization to motivate people (ibid., 277-278), such as the 
problem of climate change.  Each of these lines of research should inform intervention and non-
intervention based approaches that seek to go beyond mere speculation and actually examine the 
effects that moral concepts and arguments have on moral motivation.   
Nicole Hassoun, Emir Malikov, and Nathan Lubchenco (2016) have also taken up the 
non-intervention based method of studying the principles that seem to best capture people’s 
donation behavior in funding microloans to persons in developing countries.  Non-intervention 
based approaches may serve as a way of testing the extensional adequacy of empirical claims 
regarding what kinds of moral attitudes and principles tend to motivate particular moral 
behaviors.  For instance, we might examine the extent to which individuals’ moral foundations 
(Graham et al. 2011; Haidt 2012; Feinberg and Willer 2015) or sense of their own moral identity 
(Bryan et al. 2011, 2012) predict which moral principles provide the best unifying explanations 
for their actions when they are given an opportunity to address a moral problem like global 
poverty.  These and other examples may be furnished as possible ways of examining the 
motivational effects of normative concepts when they have been internalized and assessing 
normative concepts, in part, on this basis. 
 
2) How people will be prevented from acting when such norms, theories, and principles are 
internalized (Prevention) 
 
 In addition to intervention and non-intervention based approaches to looking at the 
effects of normative concepts in promoting certain types of behavior, empirical research can be 
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useful in assessing the ability of normative concepts to prevent harmful behaviors.  Jeanette 
Kennett and Cordelia Fine (2009) survey the literature suggesting that moral judgments are not 
merely post hoc rationalizations (contra Haidt 2001) but can help us to regulate our behaviors 
prospectively.15  They convincingly argue that judgments about moral principles can have 
prosocial effects when used in the right ways.  Consider Daniel Batson’s important research (see, 
e.g., Batson 2008) showing that people’s tendencies to cheat and play unfairly in games can be 
inhibited by making them feel that they are being observed.  Notably, this awareness doesn’t 
have to be conscious and may be activated by even as minimal a stimulus as a mirror or 
representation of a pair of eyes (see also Bateson et al. 2006 and Ernest-Jones et al. 2011).  
Empirical research could study, for instance, whether there is a difference in the ability to 
suppress the tendency to cheat or act selfishly in individuals who employ either more 
consequentialist or deontological reasoning.  Robert Wicklund (1979) also suggests that 
promoting objective self-awareness leads to better behavior, whereas Kathleen Vohs and 
Jonathan Schooler (2008) find that a free-will manipulation increasing subject’s sense that they 
have free will improves their conduct.  It may then be that moral theories that emphasize these 
notions, such as Kantian deontology, which focuses heavily on the notion of a singular free 
rational subject, will have the tendency to produce better behavior than moral theories issued 
from the “point of view of the universe” such as consequentialism (Sidgwick 1907).  The 
fruitfulness of normative concepts can be assessed not only by what they directly promote, but 
also what they prevent in terms of human tendencies to act in ways that are unfair or harmful to 
others. 
																																																								
15 See, e.g., Barrett et al. (2004), Payne (2005), and Amodio et al. (2008). 
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3) When some norms, theories, and principles compete with bias and other problematic such 
items, which are more effective in “fighting back” (Resilience) 
  
 Related to the prior point, there is the matter of pre-existing biases and attitudes that are 
problematic and tend to influence behavior but do not always do so.  Implicit biases and 
stereotype threat can affect people who do not explicitly endorse the relevant attitudes.16  
Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock (1999) have found that knowing that we will be accountable 
to others for explaining our actions typically inhibits bias and improves judgment.  Kennett and 
Fine (2009) discuss Keith Payne’s research suggesting that we can inhibit the behavioural 
expression of bias through goal-directed processing, such as when one has a salient egalitarian 
goal of preventing oneself from stereotyping others (Payne 2005).  Betsy Levy Paluck’s research 
(Levy Paluck et al. 2016) also suggests that with certain practical problems, such as bullying, 
theories that make reference to individuals who are viewed as sources of normative information 
may be more motivating than theories that are presented in more general terms.  This research 
may provide reason to think that virtue theoretic approaches do, contrary to common criticisms, 
have distinctive practical benefits.  Empirical methods can be used to assess whether certain 
normative concepts or theoretical approaches are better or worse in empowering people to resist 
the influence of implicit biases and other problematic attitudes across a range of issues. 
																																																								
16 Recent studies have questioned the extent to which both implicit bias and stereotype threat 
affect the kinds of behaviors thought to be affected by them in in prior research.  While some of 
these effects have not replicated in these studies, other effects, such as the “shooter bias” effect 
(Correll et al. 2002), have replicated (Essien et al. 2017).  There is an ongoing debate about the 
effects of implicit bias and stereotype threat on particular behaviors and what conclusions can be 
drawn from this literature for public policy.  The point that I am making here relies only on the 
claim that any negative effects of biases grounded in social group membership on evaluations of 
others and oneself are worth addressing through the use of normative concepts if doing so is 
possible, and there is some evidence that this can be done (see Payne 2005). 
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Sally Haslanger (2000, 2012) focuses on this potential effect of a concept in putting 
forward a feminist, antiracist theory of the concepts of race and gender.  “At the most general 
level,” she writes, “the task is to develop accounts of gender and race that will be effective tools 
in the fight against injustice” (2000, p. 36).  I will discuss Haslanger’s view and how what I’m 
calling “resilience” relates to it in Section 5. 
 
4) Whether some norms, theories, and principles are better subjects of consensus among people 
with other commitments that are consistent with good will and a desire for peaceful coexistence 
(Consensus) 
 
A further criterion of fruitfulness for normative concepts concerns whether or not such 
concepts are better able to secure consensus among people with other commitments that differ 
and who are at least not opposed to cooperation and coexistence.  An example of the sort of 
research that examines the degree to which a normative concept is fruitful in this way can be 
found in the empirical literature on Rawls’ theory of justice.  Norman Frohlich and Joe 
Oppenheimer (1987) were some of the first social scientists to look at whether people placed in a 
situation that is meant to model Rawls’ original position would select principles of justice of the 
kind that Rawls predicted.  Strikingly, they found that their subjects in this setup tended to 
endorse a restricted utilitarian principle, which allows for the maximization of utility once 
everyone meets a basic minimum standard, rather than the difference principle.  Because this 
research focuses on income distributions, and not primary goods in general, their result is not 
strictly incompatible with Rawls’ prediction.  Still, this experiment provides at least suggestive 
evidence that a restricted utilitarian principle will achieve consensus among subjects in the 
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original position, whereas Rawls holds that the difference principle will defeat this principle 
(2001, pp. 126–130).  Their finding has been replicated (Lissowski et al. 1991; Bruner 2018).  
However, some have argued against the idea that we will be able to find either a single, uniquely 
choiceworthy set of principles of justice (Sugden 1990; Skyrms 1996, 2016; Thrasher 2013; 
Muldoon et al. 2014) or procedure for arriving at such principles (Gaus 2010; Moehler 2018; 
Bruner and Lindauer forthcoming).  Such criticism is compatible, of course, with the goal of 
finding principles and procedures that will be widely accepted.  At the level of individual 
morality, Mikhail (2007; 2011) has sought to uncover a “universal moral grammar” that 
underlies the ethical frameworks that all cultures possess.  This fundamental layer of moral 
cognition may be used to derive clues regarding which normative concepts will tend to secure 
the most widespread agreement.  Empirical methods can shed light on both the uptake17 of 
normative concepts in varied individuals and how well these concepts provide a common ground 
for working together to solve practical problems. 
 
5) Whether norms, theories, and principles provide or help us to formulate more useful 
prescriptions than others with respect to problems that we must solve (Guidance) 
 
																																																								
17 Working largely within the framework of Carnapian explication, Pinder (forthcoming) argues 
that experimental philosophy can help to determine whether explicated concepts are fruitful in 
the sense that they can achieve uptake by “the relevant theoretical community.”  Although I find 
much to agree with in Pinder, my view is not offered within the Carnapian framework, with its 
emphasis on explication.  It is also a commitment of my view that, rather than only achieving 
uptake by moral and political philosophers, ordinary people as moral agents and citizens are part 
of the relevant community that moral and political philosophy must be fruitful for.  This 
commitment, I suggest throughout the paper, is not uncommon among moral and political 
philosophers who take the practical upshots of their views to be philosophically significant. 
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 Many philosophers hold that a moral theory should be action guiding, or at least that 
being action-guiding is a strike in a moral theory’s favor.  For instance, a traditional objection to 
Aristotelian virtue ethics is that it doesn’t provide us with sufficient instructions for how to 
respond morally to situations that we find ourselves in, merely telling us to do as the virtuous 
person would do.  I have suggested above that I think this objection ignores ways in which virtue 
ethical approaches may have distinctive practical benefits, but it is a common objection to such 
approaches and one that presupposes that moral theories should be useful in guiding action.  
Philosophers have also recently been interested in how feasibility constraints should enter into 
our moral and political theorizing, and whether a theory takes such constraints into account 
affects its action-guiding potential.  As in ethics, one position in political philosophy involves the 
view that feasibility constraints are irrelevant to our theorizing about justice.  But other 
philosophers have thought that, at least with some of our purposes as moral and political 
philosophers, feasibility constraints should be taken into account (Southwood 2016).  Part of 
why we should care about feasibility constraints, these philosophers think, is because we need 
moral and political philosophy to issue us guidance about what to do about real world moral 
problems.  This is often how the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is cashed out, 
where non-ideal theory is meant to play a role in helping us to address such problems (see, e.g., 
Valentini 2012).18  Some philosophers have argued that their theories of political justice (Rawls 
1971/rev. 1999, 1980, 1993) or freedom (Pettit 1999, 2014) provide better guidance than their 
alternatives and that this is a mark in their favor.  For Rawls, the “task” of political philosophy is 
“to articulate a public conception of justice that all can live with who regard their person and 
their relation to society in a certain way” (Rawls 1980, p. 519).  He goes on to make the even 
																																																								
18 Mills (2005).  See Valentini (2012) for a helpful overview of the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. 
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stronger claim that while “doing this may involve settling theoretical difficulties, the practical 
social task is primary.”  In addition to being the subject of an “overlapping consensus” (Rawls 
1971, 1993), a Rawlsian public conception of justice is supposed to guide citizens in developing 
and reforming their society’s political institutions on grounds that all citizens can accept.  Philip 
Pettit refers to his republican conception of freedom as non-domination as a “moral compass” 
(2014) and describes it as a regulative ideal for assessing and reforming societal policies and 
institutions.  He holds that from a purely theoretical perspective, it is less clear that we should 
prefer this conception to the alternative libertarian and liberal conceptions of freedom.  But once 
we account for its superior ability to provide guidance on how to evaluate and reform a society’s 
institutions in line with the demands of justice, republican freedom is the winner among these 
competing conceptions of freedom. 
 Whether a given moral or political norm, theory, or principle provides helpful guidance 
concerning how to solve practical problems is an empirical fact.  Studies can be designed, for 
instance, to see whether reflecting on people who are moral exemplars tends to lead subjects to 
behave more fairly than they otherwise would.  There is evidence to suggest that thinking about 
positive exemplars from one’s own social group(s) can inhibit the effects of stereotype threat 
(Marx and Roman 2002; McIntyre et al. 2003, 2005).  Further, it may also be the case that 
thinking about virtuous individuals, while this may not yield a determinate answer to what to do 
in scenarios like those presented in the trolley problem, will be more helpful than using the 
abstract, general principles of other approaches to moral theory in a variety of situations (Levy 
Paluck et al. 2016).  If this were the case, as I have suggested above, it would imply that virtue 
ethics can be action guiding and perhaps have distinctive practical benefits.  Similarly, we may 
test whether the Rawlsian conception of justice helps participants to divide resources up in ways 
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that other participants regard as fair, and whether Pettit’s conception of freedom does allow 
persons to form consistent and plausible judgments about how to address societal injustices.   
Other examples where political concepts have been thought to be more or less action 
guiding than alternatives are found in the literatures on racial inequality and on measures of 
welfare.  In the literature on race, it has been argued that colorblind policies do not provide good 
guidance on how to solve problems of racial prejudice and inequality in societies with histories 
of racial injustice (Boxill 1992; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Anderson 2010; Mills 2011).  In the 
literature on welfare, it has been argued that subjective measures won’t guide us to improve the 
welfare of the worst off because their subjective reports are often influenced by the fact that 
marginalized people can have harmful adaptive preferences that are the result of internalizing 
their oppression (Khader 2011).  Further empirical study will be useful in determining which 
moral and political concepts best respond to these problems. 
 The above examples are meant to give a better sense of how empirical research on these 
topics either has been or could be conducted.  Of course, no one experiment or set of 
experiments is likely to settle the question of whether a given normative concept is, in the 
intended sense, a fruitful one.  This is a caricature of the positive program.  Ethics is not reduced 
to opinion polling by my approach, but rather takes into account empirical data that bears on the 
fruitfulness of the normative concepts at hand.  Notably, there will typically be a gap between the 
data that we need in order to know which concepts can help us solve practical problems and the 
data available in a context where philosophers are not involved in conducting empirical research.  




2. Relations to Other Philosophical Views and Positions 
 
 So who would disagree with the view that I’ve put forward here?  No philosophical view 
appeals to all audiences, and it would be surprising if this one were different.  As noted above, 
there are views in moral and political philosophy that align more closely with Plato’s views than 
the one that Aristotle puts forward in suggesting that ethical study has a practical point.  In moral 
philosophy, hardcore or “robust” moral realists hold the view that facts about solving practical 
problems are strictly irrelevant to the evaluation of moral norms, theories, and principles (Enoch 
2011).  In political philosophy, the view is sometimes expressed that feasibility considerations 
and other practical facts should not enter into our evaluations of theories of political justice 
(Cohen 2008; Estlund 2014).  I noted above that my goal in this paper is not to argue directly 
against these views, but rather to show the important implications for the relationship between 
experimental philosophy and the study of normative concepts that follow from an opposing view.  
At this point, I will expand the list of prominent philosophers and positions in philosophy that 
have been and should be receptive to what I have said here. 
 While I have already mentioned Aristotle’s remarks about the practical importance of 
ethical study, it may be surprising that Kantian approaches to moral thinking, at least in the 
constructivist tradition, also provide an important line of support for thinking about the role of 
empirical research in ethics.  Kant himself, of course, had some fairly dismissive things to say 
about moral philosophy that is not purely a priori (Kant 2012, Preface).  Joshua Greene’s 
research also purports to undermine Kantian deontology and support consequentialism (Greene 
et al. 2001; Singer 2005; Greene 2007), and this might be another cause for surprise.  Yet there is 
reason to think that the Kantian constructivist tradition can provide some very helpful insights on 
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the relationship between moral thinking and the solution of practical problems.  Christine 
Korsgaard (2003) examines a distinctive trend in moral thinking that emphasizes the relationship 
between ethics and practical reasoning.  She argues that the history of constructivist and realist 
moral thought is a debate over whether or not, as the constructivist argues, a substantive account 
of morality grounded in practical reason is appropriate or whether, as realists tend to hold, 
constructivism doesn’t give morality an independent enough status.  While I don’t view realists 
per se as committed to the view that moral concepts cannot be evaluated in terms of fruitfulness, 
it will be helpful to pause on Korsgaard’s presentation of constructivism here for her useful 
formulation of the idea that moral concepts solve practical problems. 
 As I just mentioned, Korsgaard regards the substantive aspect of morality as that of 
practicality.  In particular, she holds that constructivist views regard normative concepts as 
solutions to practical problems.  For Kant, it is the problem of practical reason, a will needing a 
principle in order to be free.19  But Korsgaard notes that for Rawls, too, normative concepts can 
be evaluated in terms of whether they help us to solve practical problems.  For Rawls, justice is a 
normative concept that is supposed to solve problems in liberal societies, societies where people 
differ in their moral, religious, and other personal commitments but are also committed to 
peaceful coexistence and mutual toleration (see especially Rawls 1993).  Perhaps most obvious 
in debates surrounding Rawls’ earlier work, which was less tied to the notion of a liberal society 
in particular, is the problem of distributive justice (Rawls 1971).  Justice as fairness is a 
“conception” or specification of the concept of justice intended to solve that problem by offering 
																																																								
19 Street (2008) takes Korsgaard to task on this point, arguing that it is implausible to regard this 
as a practical problem.  However, Street in her recent work suggests that metaethics may be 
therapeutic, helping us to deal with “the problem of attachment and loss” (Street 2016), and so it 
seems that she is receptive to the thought that moral theory could be evaluated in terms of 
serving a practical purpose. 
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an account of distributive justice, that, through the original position thought experiment, all 
should realize is fair to all.  My view does not presuppose the truth of constructivism, as I’ve 
noted above.  The point is that constructivists, and Korsgaard in particular, have given a 
particularly helpful characterization of the notion that normative concepts are meant to solve 
practical problems (for Korsgaard, they just are solutions to such problems). 
There are a number of other issues and positions in moral and political philosophy that 
bear an important relation to practical action.  Take the debate between internalists and 
externalists in ethics, for instance.  For moral internalists, motivation is internal to moral 
judgment – there is a necessary connection between sincere moral judgments and motivation.20  
If someone sincerely judges that they ought to perform an action, according to this view, they 
must be at least somewhat motivated to perform that action.  If they don’t have any motivation to 
perform that action, in other words, the internalist denies that they sincerely judge that they are 
required to act in that way.  This prominent brand of moral internalism is thus committed to a 
conceptual entailment between moral judgment and action. 
 Additionally, discussions of the ought-implies-can principle in moral and political 
philosophy show that many philosophers are committed to an important role for empirical facts 
in normative philosophical research.  Many philosophers embrace this principle or hold that 
some nearby principle is correct (Southwood 2016).  Most of these principles suggest that the set 
of our morally obligatory actions consists only in actions that we are capable of performing.  
Here again, the link between practical action and morality is important, if in a different way.  In 
																																																								
20 For a helpful discussion of this view, which is often referred to as “motivational judgment 
internalism,” see Rosati (2016).  For a prominent defense of the view, see Smith (1994).  Of 
course, there are related but distinct internalist views in the literature, but the broad outlines will 
suffice for my purposes here. 
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this case, by looking at the limitations of what human beings are capable of, including 
psychological limitations, we can learn about the extent of our moral obligations. 
 This is all to make the point that what I have argued here is tied to well-established 
tendencies in moral and political philosophy and a variety of views and positions in these areas.  
In terms of the notion of fruitfulness that I have described, there may also be other ways in which 
moral and political concepts can help us to solve practical problems, such as fruitfulness in 
helping us to classify various actions, and in allowing us to justify various assignments of duties 
and responsibilities.  Much more can be said on these topics, but the point to note here is that I 
am interested in particular types of practical fruitfulness, and do not deny that there may be other 
types of fruitfulness that can go into the evaluation of moral and political concepts. 
Further, as I have suggested above, no claim regarding a concept’s fruitfulness is likely to 
be established definitively by the results of only one study.  Nor does any one empirical field 
have a claim to fundamentality or pre-eminence in providing evidence regarding the fruitfulness 
of a given normative concept in solving a particular practical problem.  Rather, evidence must be 
taken from both the armchair and the lab and balanced in reflective equilibrium to determine 
which normative concepts and their conceptions can best solve practical problems.  It is in this 
way that the unspoken agreement that I mentioned at the beginning of Section 1, between 
experimental philosophers and moral and political philosophers who are receptive to empirical 






3. Fruitfulness, Theoretical Criteria, and Practical Problems 
 
 I mentioned earlier that fruitfulness is a criterion used to evaluate normative concepts in 
addition to their being coherent and well motivated from a purely theoretical perspective.  In the 
case of arguments, we are generally only interested in the fruitfulness of ones that we take to be 
valid and sound.  The exception is when an argument contains a premise that makes a claim 
about the fruitfulness of a concept, in which case the argument would be unsound if we found 
that claim to be false.  But fruitfulness is not meant to shore up concepts or arguments that are 
bad by purely theoretical standards, ignoring the fact that they are incoherent, invalid, or 
unsound, as the case may be.  The point is to see which concepts and arguments, that at least 
some reasonable interlocutors take to be good ones, do the best job of helping us to solve 
practical problems, and of course also to evaluate claims to fruitfulness that might be used in 
philosophical arguments. 
 Further, this should not be taken to mean that just any practical problem that a 
philosophical concept helps us to solve would be relevant to the evaluation of that concept.  If 
the internalization of a philosophical concept unrelated to teenage smoking somehow led to 
lower teen smoking rates in a population, that would not be a practical problem whose resolution 
would plausibly bear a relation to the concept’s evaluation from the standpoint of philosophy 
(though perhaps it would from the standpoint of public health).  So relevance is a condition 
relating philosophical concepts to practical problems on the basis of subject matter that must be 
met for the evaluation of a concept in terms of its effects on a practical problem to be 
philosophically important.  My own view is that while some obviously irrelevant practical 
problems could be impacted by normative concepts, we will generally be able to distinguish 
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these problems from practical problems that are in the ballpark of the concept we are 
considering.  Within this range of problems, we should be fairly liberal in examining the effects 
that normative concepts can have. 
 Additionally, the way in which a moral or political concept solves a practical problem is 
important, and not just any way will do.  It would be a mistake to take the view that normative 
concepts can be evaluated in terms of fruitfulness to mean that these concepts are mere 
coordination mechanisms, to be evaluated solely in terms of whether they bring about stability, 
motivate people to perform the right kinds of actions, or meet some other practical desiderata.  
The way that they solve practical problems must be what I will call “value-consistent.”  This 
means first that the way that the concept solves the relevant practical problem must be consistent 
with other plausibly moral values, as opposed to non-moral values, such as control, domination, 
and so on.  Rawls refers to this criterion, in the case of a theory of justice, as that of achieving 
“stability for the right reasons” (Rawls 1993).  And second, the normative concept must not 
violate its own commitments in solving a practical problem.  To return to the same well-known 
example, a liberal theory of justice cannot violate the norms of liberalism, which include the 
commitment that a theory of justice must be neutral among a range of reasonable worldviews or 
“comprehensive doctrines,” in solving the problem of distributive justice in a democratic society.  
This second criterion doesn’t depend on liberalism itself being the right political doctrine, but 
rather on coherence with liberalism’s own commitments.  Each of these conditions must be met 
for the way a normative concept solves a practical problem to be normatively acceptable and 




4. Carnapian Theory Construction and Fruitfulness 
 
 Joshua Shepherd and James Justus have also recently defended the positive program in 
experimental philosophy (Shepherd and Justus 2015), in their case drawing heavily on Rudolf 
Carnap’s views on theory construction (Carnap 1950, 1955). Their defense focuses on Carnap’s 
description of the first of three stages of research that should be conducted in building a 
philosophical theory, which they call “explication preparation,” where the other two stages are 
explication and fruitfulness.  My own view borrows the term it focuses on from Carnap’s third 
stage, although my understanding of fruitfulness differs greatly from Carnap’s own.  It will be 
worth pausing to reflect on this difference, and also how Shepherd and Justus’ project differs 
from mine. 
 Shepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy can play an important role in 
explication preparation, and thereby play a positive role in developing philosophical theories.  
For Carnap, good philosophical theorizing involves the “explication” of concepts, which consists 
of identifying, evaluating, and typically revising the contents of ordinary concepts that we 
possess and use.  Philosophers precisify ordinary concepts in order that they can better serve 
purposes, primarily the purposes of scientific inquiry for Carnap.  Explication preparation 
involves clarifying the content of an ordinary concept in advance of explication.  Once these raw 
materials have been clarified, explication can proceed in precisifying the concept that is to be 
used in scientific investigation.  Then, that explication or precisification can be evaluated in 
terms of whether it enhances “fruitfulness.”  Carnap’s core example of the assessment of an 
explication in terms of fruitfulness is the move from the ordinary concept ‘fish’ to the scientific 
concept ‘piscis’ (Carnap 1950, pp. 5–6). The concept ‘fish’ is vague and includes many animals 
 27 
that are not cold-blooded or do not have gills throughout their lives.  The concept ‘piscis’ instead 
denotes only aquatic animals that are cold-blooded and that do have gills throughout life.  This 
precisified concept is more fruitful in virtue of allowing a larger number of true general 
statements to be formulated, thereby helping us to advance our understanding of underwater life. 
 Shepherd and Justus focus on explication preparation as the point of contact between 
experimental philosophy and traditional philosophical methods.  Empirical research can reveal 
ways in which the extensions or intensions of concepts are vague, show that there are multiple 
concepts operating in our thinking about a certain notion or topic that we took to primarily 
involve only one concept, discover biases influencing intuitive judgments and their sources, 
discover other unpredictable, non-bias-related influences on judgments about concepts, and 
highlight the central features of a concept and any dependence relationships that concept stands 
in with others (Shepherd and Justus 2015, pp. 390-1).  As they acknowledge, empirical research 
will not fully determine how any particular explication should proceed.  Explication involves 
choices that are partly guided by the theoretical aims that we have, such as choices about which 
aspects of a concept must be held onto and which can be abandoned.  But nonetheless, there is a 
positive contribution that empirical research can make to philosophy, according to Shepherd and 
Justus, in aiding explication preparation. 
 Shepherd and Justus have provided an important account of one role that experimental 
research can play in philosophical theory construction.  However, two important points are worth 
noting that should give us pause regarding their account.  First, it relies fairly heavily on the 
Carnapian view of theory construction, and insofar as that view is outmoded or controversial, 
their account will rest on somewhat shaky footing.  Second, and crucially, their view keeps 
experimental philosophy firmly in a handmaiden position with respect to philosophical research, 
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securing the preconditions for good philosophical theory construction without participating in it.  
Part of the challenge for experimental philosophy is to explain why it is philosophy, not just 
helpful for preventing or correcting some mistakes that we might make in the early stages of 
developing our philosophical theories. 
 Rather than preparing us to do philosophy, my view has the implication that 
experimental philosophy is part of the philosophical enterprise.  Instead of Carnap’s notion of 
fruitfulness, which involves yielding a larger number of true general statements, I have presented 
a number of ways in which philosophical concepts can be fruitful in helping us to solve practical 
problems.  These types of fruitfulness, I have noted, are tied to practical roles that moral and 
political concepts have been expected by philosophers to be evaluated in relation to.  Insofar as 
one of these philosophical concepts is fruitful, that is a strike in its favor qua philosophical 
concept. 
 This is not to say that I don’t think that experimental philosophy can play the role that 
Justus and Shepherd describe.  Nor am I taking a stand here on the role empirical research might 
have in explication, or its analogues in other views of theory construction.  My view centers on a 
plausible notion of fruitfulness for moral and political concepts that fits well with the practical 
roles that many philosophers have already thought that these concepts ought to play.  Because 
these concepts should be evaluated, in part, by criteria of fruitfulness, and empirical research will 
be important in determining whether or not concepts fulfill these criteria, empirical research is 





5. Haslanger’s Ameliorative Inquiry and Resilience 
 
 I should also discuss Sally Haslanger’s influential view about concepts and the different 
methods that we might take up in engaging with them (Haslanger 2000, 2012) and how her view 
relates to what I have said here.  Haslanger argues that some concepts might play roles that need 
to be filled, for instance in a feminist antiracist theory, and that this might be a way of 
vindicating these concepts.  What she calls an “ameliorative inquiry” into questions concerning 
the nature of gender and race examines the point of having these concepts and what cognitive or 
practical problems they might be retooled to help us solve.  Our concepts serve cognitive and 
practical purposes, and these purposes can be advanced or held back depending on how these 
concepts are characterized.  Ameliorative inquiry examines not only the practical roles that 
concepts in fact play, but also what roles they could play for us in addressing injustices, such as 
gender inequality and racism.  Her approach is meant to go beyond the method of conceptual 
analysis characteristic of ordinary language philosophy, which might examine concepts like 
gender and race by attempting to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions of their 
applications as we currently use them.  It is also distinct from a descriptive project that looks at 
the extension of concepts and, perhaps using empirical means, seeks to determine whether or not 
these concepts pick out social kinds.  Rather, ameliorative inquiry is supposed to allow us to 
revise our conceptual practices and the extensions of our concepts to better serve the moral or 
political goals that they can help us to advance. 
 Some of the points that I have made in this paper can be seen as emphasizing the role that 
empirical research should play in ameliorative inquiry.  As mentioned above, Haslanger’s goal of 
determining which concepts of gender and race “will be effective tools in the fight against 
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injustice” (2000, p. 36) fits well with my characterization of the resilience-based fruitfulness of 
concepts.  Ameliorative inquiry is, in a sense, a project of determining whether important 
concepts like gender and race can be improved upon in terms of one type21 of fruitfulness.  
 Haslanger is surely right that seemingly non-moral concepts can play political roles and 
help to structure our interactions.  Hence, I don’t want my focus on normative concepts to be 
taken as a point of disagreement.  Rather, my area of greatest familiarity is with normative 
concepts.  So it is worth distinguishing between how non-normative concepts might be fruitful in 
a normative way––realizing various moral values or helping to produce political outcomes––
without themselves being normative concepts, and the fruitfulness of normative concepts.  I take 
it that Haslanger is more focused on the former, and I am more focused on the latter.  Still, it 
seems to me that much of what I have to say about how normative concepts can be fruitful may 
also apply to some non-normative concepts.  Filling in some of these details is part of the work 
of my paper that may also be applied as a further defense of Haslanger’s notion of ameliorative 
inquiry, and how empirical research can aid such inquiry.  Of course, Knobe’s research has 
shown us that it may be difficult to distinguish between normative and non-normative concepts if 
our criterion is whether normative considerations go into their application.22  Subject matter 
seems more appropriate as a criterion, where normative concepts focus on normative subjects, 
such as morality and aesthetics, and non-normative concepts focus on subjects that are typically 
descriptive.  On my view, moral and political concepts should be assessed, in part, in terms of 
																																																								
21 It may be the case that the only concepts of gender and race that are fruitful in the resilience 
sense, of course, will also have to be fruitful in other respects – motivating various kinds of 
feminist, antiracist actions, preventing sexist and racist actions, and so on.  As with other 
concepts, an exploration of the resilience-based fruitfulness of gender and race may lead to 
questions concerning the other types of fruitfulness that I have described. 
22 For a helpful overview, see Knobe (2010). 
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their fruitfulness in helping us to solve practical problems.  This view is fully compatible with 
the view that other concepts may also play important practical roles in political life, and therefore 
also be assessed in terms of their fruitfulness. 
 
6. The Role of Philosophers in Empirical Research  
 
But why should philosophers be the ones conducting experiments?  Why isn’t everything 
that I’ve said best taken as suggesting that philosophers should engage with the work of, and 
perhaps collaborate with, psychologists?  Depending on what is meant by “collaboration,” I will 
disagree or agree with the statement implied by the second question.  If collaboration means 
discussing the experiments and their design, talking through the relevant philosophical issues, 
and working to interpret the data and its philosophical significance, there is nothing wrong with 
the statement.  This kind of “active” collaboration, to give it a name, is fine and to be encouraged 
even.  The problem is “passive” or inactive collaboration, where the philosopher simply draws 
on existing empirical research, typically only the research that seems to fit with what they want 
to say, and leaves the rest of the empirical issues to the psychologists.  Indirectly, this problem of 
“cherry picking” will be more likely to be avoided if philosophers are actively collaborating with 
psychologists and working on empirical research.  But the further answer to the first question of 
why philosophers shouldn’t just let others conduct the experiments, in the sense of being 
involved in their design, administration, and interpretation, is that the right kinds of empirical 
work won’t get done on this approach.  Philosophers are trained to draw distinctions that 
psychologists are generally not sensitive to.  Our disciplinary foci are different, and the 
ornateness of philosophical questions makes it the case that philosophical training is generally 
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required to address them.  Training is required to appreciate the importance of the nitty gritty 
questions that are within a philosophical debate, and how to design experiments to test questions 
at a level of specificity that is germane to those parts of a debate.  In general, philosophical work 
isn’t on the biggest questions, but rather takes place within a set of assumptions and 
conversations that presuppose particular ways of approaching those questions.  With the 
questions raised in moral and political philosophy, it is important that people who have the 
training to see just what concepts are being evaluated and how their fruitfulness is relevant to the 
philosophical questions under consideration be involved in designing, conducting, and 
interpreting the results of empirical research.  On my view, evaluating the fruitfulness of 
normative concepts is part of the enterprise of doing moral and political philosophy.  But 
conducting empirical research to determine the fruitfulness of these concepts and assessing the 
relevance of this research to philosophical debates are activities that involve attention to 
distinctions and subtleties that generally requires philosophical training.  An important upshot of 
my view is that moral and political philosophers must be actively involved in conducting 





 Moral and political concepts can be evaluated, in part, in terms of their fruitfulness.  
What kinds of actions they motivate people to perform and prevent them from performing, 
whether they help us in fighting back against injustices and other problematic social phenomena, 
whether they can be subjects of consensus among people of good will, and whether they provide 
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us with useful guidance are factors that determine whether these concepts can help us to solve 
practical problems.  The view that I have presented here shows that experimental philosophy can 
be part of normative philosophical research, because assessing the fruitfulness of moral and 
political concepts will require empirical research.  Rather than merely clearing the way for 
traditional methods to be employed, empirical research is continuous with traditional 
philosophical methodology.  This view is also compatible with a plausible explanation of why 
philosophers, in particular, should be involved in empirical research.  Of course, no interesting 
view appeals to everyone.  Some philosophers are opposed to letting empirical research into the 
set of approaches that shed light on philosophical questions.  Yet many other philosophers, as I 
have shown, should be receptive to the view that I have offered.  Indeed, as long as one regards 
“what practical purposes should our moral and political concepts serve?” as a sensible question 
to ask, they are the sort of theorist who can endorse what I have said about the value of empirical 








23 For early conversations on the topics addressed in this paper, I am grateful to Serene Khader, 
Josh Knobe, Tori McGeer, and Michael Strevens.  For helpful discussions of earlier versions of 
the paper and the points raised in it, I would like to thank Christian Barry, Geoff Brennan, 
Ramon Das, Ben Fraser, Ana Gantman, Simon Keller, Eric Mandelbaum, Philip Pettit, Luke 
Russell, Nic Southwood, Katie Steele, Kim Sterelny, Justin Sytsma, John Thrasher, Joe 
Ulatowski, Dan Weijers, and audiences at the First Annual Australasian Experimental 
Philosophy Workshop at Victoria University of Wellington, the Fifth Australasian Workshop in 
Moral Philosophy at the Kioloa Coastal Campus of the Australian National University, the 
Experimental Methods in Social and Political Philosophy Workshop at ANU, and the ANU 
School of Philosophy Seminar.  For helpful written comments, I am grateful to Justin Bruner, 
Toby Handfield, Frank Jackson, Serene Khader, Josh Knobe, Matt Kopec, Shaun Nichols, Peter 




Alexander, J., Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2014). Accentuate the Negative. In J. Knobe & S. 
Nichols (Eds.), Experimental Philosophy (Vol. 2, pp. 31–50). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. 
Philosophy Compass, 2(1), 56–80. 
 
Amodio, D.M., Devine, P.G., & Harman, E. (2008). Individual Differences in the Regulation of 
Intergroup Bias: The Role of Conflict Monitoring and Neural Signals for Control. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 60-74. 
 
Anderson, E. (2010). The Imperative of Integration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Aristotle. (1999). Nicomachean Ethics. (T. Irwin, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. 
Co. 
 
Barrett, L.F., Gollwitzer, P.M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). Individual 
Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Dual-Process Theories of Mind. 
Psychological Bulletin, 130, 553-575.   
 
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a 
Real-World Setting. Biology Letters, 2(3), 412–414. 
 
Batson, C. D. (2008). Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral 
Motivation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7(1), 51–66. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2003). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of 
Racial Inequality in America. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Boxill, B. R. (1992). Blacks and Social Justice (Rev. ed.). Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Bruner, J. (2018). Decisions Behind the Veil: An Experimental Approach. In T. Lombrozo, J. 
Knobe, & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (Vol. 2). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bruner, J. and Lindauer, M. (forthcoming) The Varieties of Impartiality, or, Would an 
Egalitarian Endorse the Veil? Philosophical Studies. 
 
Bryan, C.J., Walton, G.M., Rogers, T., & Dweck, C.S. (2011). Motivating Voter Turnout by 




Bryan, C.J., Adams, G.S., & Monin, B. (2012). When Cheating Would Make You a Cheater: 
Implicating the Self Prevents Unethical Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 142(4), 1001-1005. 
 
Buckland, L., Lindauer, M., Rodríguez-Arías, D., and Véliz, C. Testing the Motivational 
Strength of Positive and Negative Duty Arguments Regarding Global Poverty. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability (Second Edition.). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Carnap, R. (1955). Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages. Philosophical Studies, 6(3), 
33–47. 
 
Cohen, G. A. (2008). Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The Police Officer’s Dilemma: 
Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1314–1329. 
 
Cushman, F. (2013). Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17(3), 273-292. 
 
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Ernest-Jones, M., Nettle, D., & Bateson, M. (2011). Effects of Eye Images on Everyday 
Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 32(3), 172–
178. 
 
Essien, I., Stelter, M., Kalbe, F., Koehler, A., Mangels, J., & Meliß, S. (2017). The Shooter Bias: 
Replicating the Classic Effect and Introducing a Novel Paradigm. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 70, 41–47. 
 
Estlund, D. (2014). Utopophobia. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(2), 113–134. 
 
Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2015). From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments Facilitate 
Political Influence? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1-17. 
 




Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., & Eavey, C. L. (1987). Laboratory Results on Rawls’s 
Distributive Justice. British Journal of Political Science, 17(01), 1. 
 
Garner, R. (2007). Abolishing Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(5), 499–513. 
 
Gaus, G. (2010). The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse 
and Bounded World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Graham, J., Nosek, B.A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Spassena, K., & Ditto, P.H. (2011). Mapping the 
Moral Domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366-385. 
 
Greene, J. D. (2007). The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral 
Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science (New York, 
N.Y.), 293(5537), 2105–2108. 
 
Haidt, J. (2001). The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. 
 
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind, New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be? 
Noûs, 34(1), 31–55. 
 
Haslanger, S. (2012). Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Hassoun, N., Malikov, E., & Lubchenco, N. (2016). How People Think About Distributing Aid. 
Philosophical Psychology, 29(7), 1029–1044. 
Jaggar, A. M. (2001). Is Globalization Good for Women? Comparative Literature, 53(4), 298. 
 
Jaggar, A. M. (2005). “Saving Amina”: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue. 
Ethics & International Affairs, 19(03), 55–75. 
 
Kant, I. (2012). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (M. J. Gregor & J. Timmermann, 
Eds.) (Revised Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kennett, J., & Fine, C. (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?: The 
Implications of Social Intuitionist Models of Cognition for Meta-ethics and Moral 
Psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12(1), 77–96. 
 
Khader, S. J. (2011). Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 37 
Kitcher, P. (2014). The Ethical Project. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 
 
Knobe, J. (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(04), 
315–329. 
 
Knobe, J. (2016). Experimental Philosophy Is Cognitive Science. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter 
(Eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy (pp. 37–52). Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
Korsgaard, C. M. (2003). Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy. 
Journal of Philosophical Research, 28(Supplement), 99–122. 
 
Lawford-Smith, H. (2012). The Motivation Question: Arguments from Justice and from 
Humanity. British Journal of Political Science, 42(03), 661–678. 
 
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the Effects of Accountability. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125(2), 255–275. 
 
Levy Paluck, E., Shepherd, H. & Aronow, P.M. (2016). Changing Climates on Conflict: A 
Social Network Experiment in 56 Schools. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113(3), 566-571. 
 
Lichtenberg, J. (2010). Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms.” Ethics, 120(3), 
557–578. 
 
Lichtenberg, J. (2014). Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty. 
 
Lissowski, G., Tyszka, T., & Okrasa, W. (1991). Principles of Distributive Justice: Experiments 
in Poland and America. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(1), 98–119. 
 
Marx, D. M., & Roman, J. S. (2002). Female Role Models: Protecting Women’s Math Test 
Performance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(9), 1183–1193. 
 
McIntyre, R. B., Lord, C. G., Gresky, D. M., Ten Eyck, L. L., Frye, G. D. J., & Bond Jr., C. F. 
(2005). A Social Impact Trend in the Effects of Role Models on Alleviating Women’s 
Mathematics Stereotype Threat. Current Research in Social Psychology, 10, 116–136. 
 
McIntyre, R. B., Paulson, R. M., & Lord, C. G. (2003). Alleviating Women’s Mathematics 
Stereotype Threat Through Salience of Group Achievements. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 39(1), 83–90. 
 
Mikhail, J. M. (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(4), 143–152. 
 
 38 
Mikhail, J. M. (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the 
Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Mills, C. W. (2005). “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. Hypatia, 20(3), 165–184. 	
Mills, C. W. (2011). The Racial Contract (Nachdr.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 
 
Moehler, M. (2018). Minimal Morality: A Multilevel Social Contract Theory. Oxford University 
Press. 
Muldoon, R., Lisciandra, C., Colyvan, M., Martini, C., Sillari, G., & Sprenger, J. (2014). 
Disagreement behind the veil. Philosophical Studies, 170(3), 377-394. 
Nadelhoffer, T., & Nahmias, E. (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. 
Philosophical Explorations, 10(2), 123–149. 
 
Parfit, D. (1992). Reasons and Persons (Repr.). Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
Payne, B. K. (2005). Conceptualizing Control in Social Cognition: How Executive Functioning 
Modulates the Expression of Automatic Stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89(4), 488–503. 
 
Pettit, P. (1999). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Pettit, P. (2014). Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (First Edition). New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
Pinder, M. (forthcoming). Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian 
Explication?: X-Phi and Explication. Ratio. 
 
Pogge, T. W. (2008). World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Second Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice (rev. 1999.). Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 77(9), 
515. 
 
Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 




Rosati, C. S. (2016, Winter Edition). Moral Motivation. In (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-
motivation 
 
Shepherd, J., & Justus, J. (2015). X-Phi and Carnapian Explication. Erkenntnis, 80(2), 381–402. 
 
Sidgwick, H. (1907). The Methods of Ethics (Seventh Edition). London: Macmillan.  
 
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–
243. 
 
Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and Intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3–4), 331–352. 
 
Skitka, L.J., Bauman, C.W., & Sargis, E.G. (2005). Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to 
Attitude Strength or Something More? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
88(6), 895-917. 
 
Skitka, L.J. (2010). The Psychology of Moral Conviction. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 4(4), 267-281. 
 
Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press. 
Skyrms, B. (2016). Evolution, Norms and the Social Contract. Arizona State Law Journal, 48, 
1087-1100. 
Slovic, P. (2007). “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95. 
 
Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., & Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of 
Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102, 143-153. 
 
Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. 
 
Southwood, N. (2016). Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 44(1), 7–
45. 
 
Street, S. (2008). Constructivism about Reasons. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics (Vol. 3, pp. 207–245). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Street, S. (2016). Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss. Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume, 90(1), 161–189. 
 
Sugden, R. (1990). Contractarianism and Norms. Ethics, 100(4), 768-786. 
 
Sytsma, J., & Livengood, J. (2016). The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. 
Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. 
 40 
Thrasher, J. (2012). Uniqueness and symmetry in bargaining theories of justice. Philosophical 
Studies, 167(3), 683-699. 
Valentini, L. (2012). Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map: Ideal vs Non-ideal Theory. 
Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 654–664. 
 
Vohs, K. & Schooler, J.W. (2008) The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in 
Determinism Increases Cheating.  Psychological Science, 19(1), 49-54. 
 
Walker, M.U. (2007). Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics (Second Edition). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Weinberg, J. M. (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 318–343. 
 
Wicklund, R.A. (1979). The Influence of Self-Awareness on Human Behavior: The Person Who 
Becomes Self-Aware is More Likely to Act Consistently, Be Faithful to Societal Norms, 
and Give Accurate Reports About Himself. American Scientist, 67(2), 187-193. 
 
Williamson, T. (2016). Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy. In J. Sytsma & W. 
Buckwalter (Eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy (pp. 22–36). Chichester, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
X-Phi’s New Take on Old Problems. (2010, August 19). The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/19/x-phis-new-take-on-old-problems 
